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Public/Private Ventures is a national non-
profit organization whose mission is to
improve the effectiveness of social policies,
programs and community initiatives, espe-
cially as they affect youth and young adults.
In carrying out this mission, P/PV works
with philanthropies, the public and business
sectors, and nonprofit organizations.
We do our work in four basic ways:
 We develop or identify social policies,
strategies and practices that promote
individual economic success and citizenship,
and stronger families and communities.
 We assess the effectiveness of these promising
approaches and distill their critical elements
and benchmarks, using rigorous field study
and research methods.
 We mine evaluation results and
implementation experiences for their policy
and practice implications, and communicate
the findings to public and private decision-
makers, and to 
community leaders.
 We create and field test the building blocks—
model policies, financing approaches,
curricula and training materials,
communication strategies and learning
processes—that are necessary to implement
effective approaches more broadly. We then
work with leaders of the various sectors to
implement these expansion tools, and to
improve their usefulness.
P/PV’s staff is composed of policy leaders
in various fields; evaluators and researchers
in disciplines ranging from economics to
ethnography; and experienced practition-
ers from the nonprofit, public, business
and philanthropic sectors.
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1“Effectiveness must become the principal criteri-
on for givers of time and money.” This clarion
declaration is the first of five conclusions of the
1997 report of The National Commission on
Philanthropy and Civic Renewal, Giving Better,
Giving Smarter.1 The following year, the United
Way’s Resource Network stated, “In growing
numbers, service providers, governments, other
funders and the public are calling for clearer evi-
dence that the resources they expend actually
produce benefits for people…Many foundations
now require programs they fund to measure and
report on outcomes.”2 The call for a greater focus
on outcomes in philanthropic giving has gained
increasing prominence and adherents during
the 1990s.
Grantees report that never before have grant
negotiations with foundation staffs been so
focused on specifying outcomes. Some founda-
tions have employed consultants to work with
their staffs so that inputs, operational processes,
and intended intermediate and long-term
outcomes and impacts are specified and differen-
tiated. A number have added evaluation
departments to their organizational structure.
Small and medium sized foundations, which
have previously given exclusively to direct
services, are now asking for and funding evalua-
tions, so that they may know with objectivity and
rigor if the projected outcomes are achieved.
The national office of United Way—whose local
chapters raised $3.2 billion in 1997—initiated
several years ago a major project to both empha-
size the importance of specifying outcomes for
local giving, and to provide assistance to local
chapters on how to go about determining the
outcomes of individual grants. This effort, fund-
ed by the W.K. Kellogg Foundation and the
Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, resulted in
Measuring Program Outcomes: A Practical Approach
and Focusing on Outcomes. As of the beginning
of 1997, 22,000 manuals have been sold to
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2agencies who are being asked by United
Way and others to provide measures of
effectiveness in their grant applications.
At first blush this “outcomes movement”
seems like an unreservedly good thing.
Who can be against more careful specifica-
tion of what grants are intended to achieve,
and more rigorous and objective efforts to
assess exactly what they do achieve? This is
especially true in a sector that is often criti-
cized for its overemphasis on personal
relationships and ideological correctness
(in whatever direction) in its giving prac-
tices, and for its lack of rigor and public
openness in assessing and communicating
the effectiveness of its giving. Especially in
a country whose dominant sector—the pri-
vate for-profit sector that creates the wealth
that fuels the philanthropic sector—
provides on a regular basis an objective,
detailed and public accounting of most of
its companies’ outcomes and performance,
and where all of that sector’s units prosper
or wither by that impersonal accounting.
In that light, the “outcomes movement” is
a welcome coming of age for philanthropy,
a voluntary descent from its lofty perch on
the mountain top to the life of Everyman
in the valley below, where the esteem one is
held in depends largely on what one
achieves, as measured by the cold outcomes
of the particular marketplace. You can
almost feel the keystone of accountability
grind into its long-awaited place.
There is a healthy measure of truth to all of
the above. And if the alternative is not car-
ing about outcomes, or not caring about
the reliability of how we assess them—not
caring about accountability—then the
recent emphasis on outcomes is an unre-
servedly good thing. But, in fact, a more
complex reality underlies the current “out-
comes movement.”
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3The Context
The overwhelming majority of projects,
organizations, initiatives and programs sup-
ported by philanthropy are not formally
assessed for outcome achievement. Many do
not even generate basic descriptive informa-
tion about the content, quantity and quality
of what they do, much less assess what they
accomplish. Anecdote, salesmanship, ideol-
ogy and relationships are as much the basis
for many philanthropic funding decisions as
is a hard analysis of outcomes. As noted
above, it is this feature of philanthropic
practice that makes the outcome movement
so appealing.
But it is historically inaccurate to see the
current “outcomes movement” as a major
innovation in the philanthropic sector. The
interest in outcomes is as old as the interest
in giving. In fact, most philanthropists are
quick to declare their intended outcomes,
for their very purpose in giving is to cause
change. The word “outcome” may represent
more stylish jargon, but the meaning
behind the word—change for the better—
has always been there.
Neither is it the case that the “outcomes
movement” brings a new focus on
measurement, nor on new measurement
techniques. Many of the largest and most
influential of philanthropic institutions
have been deeply engaged in specifying
and measuring the outcomes of their
giving for several decades now. The Ford
Foundation actually created organizations
such as Public/Private Ventures and the
Manpower Demonstration Research
Corporation in the mid-1970s in order to
obtain, with the most sophisticated
evaluation techniques available, reliable
information about the effectiveness of
social initiatives in many areas—welfare,
employment and training, public housing,
transportation, education and youth devel-
opment, to name but several major
“outcome areas.” Evaluations of the initia-
tives cited above have been supported not
just by Ford, but by over 100 foundations,
including over three-quarters of the coun-
try’s 25 largest foundations. They have
employed random assignment, economet-
ric models, ethnography, qualitative
analysis, political science and sociology,
among many disciplines and methodolo-
gies, both separately and together.
Is then the current “outcomes movement”
simply an attempt to extend the practices
and knowledge of this substantial group of
foundations to all the rest—and to help
ensure that recent and projected growth in
the number of foundations and in aggre-
gate philanthropic wealth will also include
an appropriate emphasis on outcomes spec-
ification and measurement, and a
sophistication based on previous experi-
ence? Certainly that is a worthy goal. 
But there is more to the current emphasis
on outcomes—and the history behind it—
than that some practice it, and many do
not, and that the word and the practice
need to be spread. In fact, the recent
history of philanthropic giving in several
important areas of social policy can be
characterized as having placed a major
emphasis on outcomes assessment—and
having concluded that the dominant result
of those assessments, is that the intended
outcomes were not achieved.
For example, in the fields of welfare and
employment training there have been, over
the past two decades, a significant number
of well-done studies, the overwhelming
majority of which revealed poor results.3
Summarizing this major body of work, for-
mer Secretary Robert Reich states, “Even
successful education and training programs
rarely live up to all the expectations placed
in them…[They] often cannot lift disadvan-
taged participants out of poverty.” A major
evaluation of this kind, the National JTPA
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4Study (Bloom et al., 1993), was a major
impetus for Congress’s dramatic rethinking
of the nation’s employment and training
system.4 These very studies have helped
build support for the notion that social
interventions “don’t work,” and that public
funding reductions are justified.
Thus, past outcome studies have become
an integral part of the politics of social
policy—as will products of the current out-
comes movement. Failure has produced
more than lessons to build on; it has helped
produce pessimism about what social
policy—the public will applied to social
problems—can accomplish.
Thus the current emphasis on outcomes
may, for particular foundations, be a new
emphasis, and may require the acquisition
of new competencies and cause new pat-
terns of giving—but for philanthropy as a
whole, the deeper roots of and implications
for the current focus on outcomes are in
the failure of past initiatives to achieve
their specified outcomes.
That failure—and the ample and rigorous
documenting of it in fields like welfare and
employment training—casts a very differ-
ent light on the recent emphasis on
outcomes, and the actions and priorities it
should generate, than does the absence of
outcome studies on most grants and at
many foundations. Absence would prompt
us to action, as quickly as is possible, to fill
the void; studies would abound. The light
of failure would have the hues of caution
and care in proceeding. It would push us to
diagnose deeply the strength of the causal
relationship between the desired outcome
and the initiative to be funded—as well as
the likelihood that it will be implemented
as conceived. Goodness of motivation and
strength of vision would not alone generate
studies of outcomes. It would make us
examine very closely the practical, as well
as conceptual, strength of the evaluation
design being adopted, so that the results
obtained from the study were not shaped
by the manner of collecting information. It
would lead us a bit more into the perplex-
ing issues of organizational capacity and
implementation, the relationship between
deep cultural values and political will, and
the interplay between external help and
individual change. It might cause us at
times to delay beginning an outcomes study
until intermediate implementation and
capacity goals are met.
In short, the context of the current “out-
comes movement” is complex, full of
experience and insights that often lead in
different directions. That context in no way
undercuts the importance of a funder and
a grantee being able to articulate what it is
they are aiming to achieve, and how they
will know whether it is achieved—but it
does indicate that both the what and the
how may not be as clear cut as they had
hoped.
This paper attempts to lay out some of the
factors that need to be considered when a
philanthropy decides to put a greater
emphasis on “outcomes.” We divide the fac-
tors into three broad categories: Technical
(How to Measure); Substantive (What to
Evaluate); and Strategic (What to Do).
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5Technical Issues 
(How to Measure)
The first and most fundamental technical
issue is that outcomes are not the same as
impacts. A program or project may specify,
measure and achieve its outcomes—and
still not have any incremental impact com-
pared to other or no interventions.
How can that be? The National Supported
Work Demonstration of the mid to late
1970s provides an excellent example of this
phenomenon (Hollister et al., 1984).5 The
program was offered to four groups of
unemployed individuals: ex-offenders, out-
of-school youth, former drug addicts and
AFDC recipients. All the participants were
members of a group whose employment
prospects were not good, and came to the
program in need of jobs. During the follow-
up period of two to three years, the
employment rates of all the program partic-
ipants increased significantly—but so did
the employment rates of control group
members. In fact, except among the AFDC
recipients, the employment rates of the
comparison group members were higher
than those of the program participants.
Thus, while the program looked effective
when the key outcome variable was exam-
ined, the program actually did not improve
the situations of the participants any more
than what would have happened in the
absence of the program.
In the mid to late 1980s, the Summer
Training and Education Program (STEP)
offered half-time work and half-time reme-
diation to educationally and economically
disadvantaged youth (Walker and Vilella-
Velez, 1992).6 The goal of the program was
to increase the youth’s academic compe-
tence. However, over the approximately two
months of the summer program, partici-
pants’ test scores did not increase and
actually decreased slightly (Sipe, Grossman
and Milliner, 1987).7 On the face of it, it
appeared that the program was ineffective;
however, over the same period the test
scores of the control group members plum-
meted nearly a grade level. Thus, rather
than being ineffective, STEP was able to
dramatically stem the summer learning loss
that occurred in these youth.
Does this mean that projecting and measur-
ing outcomes, without assessing impacts by
means of a control or comparison group, is
without value? No. General knowledge
about how similar participants ordinarily
do vis-a-vis the desired goals, and about the
availability of services vis-a-vis the number
of people who need and want them, can
help form a reasoned judgment about a
program’s value. Detailed knowledge about
the quality of each component of a pro-
gram, why participants stay and why they
leave, is also useful. A strong program theo-
ry about what should happen to a
participant, and detailed knowledge about
the actual implementation and course of
participation, is even better. These tech-
niques do not provide the certainty of an
impact evaluation, but they are clearly use-
ful, and usually better than random
impressions.
But it does mean that, in the absence of a
sound comparative study, it is often difficult
to know to what degree the outcomes
achieved are attributable to the initiative
funded. This can lead to some situations
even more puzzling to the intelligent citi-
zen and voter than is the Supported Work
example. For example, the 1983 federal Job
Training Partnership Act (JTPA) programs
aimed to place poor people with multiple
obstacles to employment into jobs; the
Act put a major emphasis on quantitative
placement rates as a measure of local
success in achieving the Act’s goals. Local
administrators set very high goals for the
programs they funded, and offered finan-
cial incentives.
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try began to soar—to over 80 percent in
many locations—and were verified as factu-
ally accurate, critics speculated that these
rates were too good, and indicated that
most JTPA participants did not have serious
obstacles to employment and would have
gotten jobs even without JTPA’s modest
training interventions.
JTPA advocates scoffed. Then an impact
study was done. It basically supported the
critics. It indicated that JTPA even harmed
the labor market prospects of some youth-
ful participants. Well-specified outcomes,
careful measurement, incentives and good
performance all amounted to very little
added value.
So the major “technical” issue for the out-
comes movement is that even when
outcomes are clearly specified and relevant
information is carefully and credibly col-
lected, outcome studies may not lead to
accurate conclusions about what the pro-
gram or initiative actually accomplished.
The problem is particularly acute when the
outcomes are aimed at producing long-
term changes in human behavior (as most
important outcomes do).
Are there technical solutions to this prob-
lem? Theoretically, yes: one is to use a
comparison group so that the counter-fac-
tual question—what would have happened
in the absence of the program or initia-
tive—can be addressed. But there are
numerous technical issues to be addressed
in designing and carrying out a credible
comparison study. For the purpose of this
article, it is useful to highlight three of
those issues.
1. A sound comparison group methodology is
not always available. A good comparison
group is one that looks like the program
group, at least on key features. Typically,
comparison groups are selected so that they
match the program group on all the factors
that fundamentally determine the key
outcomes. Employment program comparison
group members are usually matched by age,
race, gender and education. The more
factors that fundamentally influence the key
outcomes, the harder it is to find a group
that matches the program group on all of
them. For example, it is very difficult to find
good comparisons for use in interventions
that target entire communities—such as
comprehensive community initiatives or
enterprise-empowerment zones. Community
outcomes—such as economic or social well-
being indicators—are influenced by a myriad
of factors. Even communities that are quite
similar at one point in time generally diverge
over the time it takes for the programs to
take effect. Therefore, the more factors that
influence the key outcomes and the longer
an intervention takes to achieve change, the
harder it is to find a sound comparison
group.
2. The number of participants is often not large
enough. In order to detect a program’s
impact by contrasting program and
comparison group behavior, one must take
into account that the behaviors of even very
similar individuals naturally differ.
Technically, evaluators get around this
complication by not only matching the two
groups as closely as possible, but also by
comparing the outcomes of large groups of
participants and nonparticipants (i.e.,
comparison group members). The more
natural variation there is in an outcome
among like individuals, the larger the groups
must be. Given the need to average out the
natural variation in outcomes, small local
programs may find that they do not have
enough participants available to statistically
detect their program’s effects.
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73. The comparison group’s activities are often
not distinct enough to permit a sound
conclusion about the content of the program
or initiative’s impact. Most new programs do
not offer completely new services, but rather
offer higher quality services, a more
complete package of services, and/or include
critical elements missing in earlier programs.
Thus, when testing such programs, it is often
the case that comparison group members are
able to enroll in fundamentally similar
services. For example, many of the
comparison group members of Project
Redirection—an employment, education and
parenting program for teen mothers—found
their way into education or training
programs, as well as parenting classes, by the
end of the study (Polit, Quint and Riccio,
1988).8 In such cases, when the program
group is compared to the comparison group,
one is not answering the question, “How did
the participants fare compared to what would
have happened had they done nothing?”
but rather, “How did the participants fare
compared to what they would have been able
to find on their own?” The answer to the
second question is a smaller impact than the
first, and thus is harder to detect.9 Simple
participant/comparison group comparisons
are often not powerful enough to detect such
impacts.
So, the solution to the technical problem
generates its own group of technical prob-
lems. It is at this point that some who
began with great enthusiasm for the out-
comes movement lose patience, and
wonder if there are not simpler, less expen-
sive and less time-consuming ways to arrive
at reasoned conclusions about whether
their giving has accomplished its aims. 
The answer is “of course.” Experienced
observation plus basic data plus a sound
theory plus some in-depth anecdotes and
you can arrive at a reasoned conclusion.
The problem—as the Supported Work and
JTPA examples highlight—is that the con-
clusions based on these methods may be
incorrect more than a modest percentage
of the time. That is a risk worth taking if
the funder is not willing to devote the
resources and time to supporting a techni-
cally sound impact study.
The technical issues discussed above pose
substantial challenges to a philanthropy
that wants to focus on outcomes. The good
news, however, is that there is a substantial
body of thought about these technical
issues, and that a “soundest approach” can
usually be crafted. It just takes resources,
and a willingness to use them on this issue.
As in many areas of human endeavor, in
fact, the progress made on the technical
issues surrounding the measurement of
outcomes in social policy has been greater
and faster than the progress made on how
to achieve those outcomes.
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8Substantive Issues 
(What to Evaluate)
A careful look at the many outcome and
impact studies conducted over the past two
decades fairly quickly leads the observant
reader to the conclusion that there must be
deep substantive themes connecting many
of the initiatives that have been evaluated,
some root causes of the weak results they
report so consistently.
Examination of the smaller group of stud-
ies that report stronger outcomes only
strengthens this conclusion, which typically
comes in two forms, whatever field of social
policy we are looking at: first, that the basic
substantive strategy was not, in fact, well
implemented; and second, that the basic
substantive strategy, even if well-implement-
ed, was not strong enough to reach the
desired results. We deal with the first type
of conclusion in this section, and the sec-
ond in the next. These generic conclusions
are important for many reasons, not least
of which is their implication for the current
outcomes movement that neither a greater
emphasis on outcomes (the notion that
articulating them will improve their
chances of occurrence), nor an improved
technical approach to measuring outcomes,
is likely to increase the probability of gener-
ating those outcomes. 
During the past 25 years, formal outcome
and impact assessments have been institut-
ed in three basic categories of activity: new
program initiatives, modified program ini-
tiatives and longstanding program
initiatives. If one draws back far enough
from the details, an interesting pattern is
discernible:
1. Evaluations of new program initiatives are
dominated by no or negative outcome and
impact findings;
2. Evaluations of modified program initiatives
are mixed in their findings of no, negative,
modest or good outcomes and impacts; and
3. Evaluations of longstanding program
initiatives are more likely to have modest or
good outcomes and impacts.
This distribution of findings suggests that
issues of operational capacity and imple-
mentation quality may indeed affect the
outcomes and impacts our studies are dis-
closing. The massive review of employment
and training evaluations done by the U.S.
Department of labor (DOL) came to a sim-
ilar conclusion:
“It often takes time for programs to
begin to work. Many of the success
stories in training for the disadvantaged
have come from programs which were
operating for five years or more before
they were evaluated.” (U.S. Department
of Labor, 1995, p.63.)
The logical implication of both organiza-
tional development theory and this
experience is that funders should probably
focus outcome and impact assessment
resources only on stable programs and ini-
tiatives that have a track record and have
refined their substantive strategies based on
years of operational experience. It is in
examining a mature program that one is
likely to provide an accurate assessment of
the impact and outcome potential of a par-
ticular substantive strategy.
Does this mean that the foundation and
policy worlds should abandon pilot or
“demonstration” programs? Should no
research be done on new programs or
demonstrations? No—just not formal out-
come or impact assessment until the
programs have matured. Since the late
1970s and the negative income tax experi-
ments, policymakers have tried out new
social policy strategies in “demonstrations”
or pilot programs. Much can be learned
operationally from these demonstrations.
What are the major hurdles for the pro-
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9gram? Does the program model make
sense? Is it operationally feasible? What
refinements would enable the program to
operate better? What types of individuals
are attracted to such a program? However,
because the operators are just learning how
to deliver the desired services, and the
kinks in a program will take several years to
discover and iron out, dispositive evidence
of effectiveness should not be sought from
demonstrations of new models. Judgments
about the effectiveness of model elements
or practices should come from research
conducted on established programs.
The strategic rethinking of outcome
research we are suggesting has important
implications for the outcomes movement in
philanthropy. One is that it should stimu-
late more coordinated efforts among
foundations, since the outcomes emphasis
should be less on assessing every program
and more on (1) finding a stable exemplar
to assess, one that represents solid imple-
mentation of a particular substantive idea,
and (2) developing from that exemplar a
set of operational benchmarks by which to
assess the progress of newer operational
manifestations of that idea.
An example of this approach is the nation-
al impact evaluation we carried out on Big
Brothers Big Sisters (BBBS) over the 1992-
95 period. The mentoring field was (and
is) exploding with activity, and yet there
were no credible findings about outcomes.
BBBS is the brand name in the mentoring
business; evaluating it, we felt, would pro-
vide a good indication of the utility of the
mentoring idea as shaped by years of opera-
tional experience (Tierney and Grossman,
1995). Eleven foundations supported this
study.
The findings were positive: mentoring had
impacts on the initiation of drug use,
school behavior and performance, and
fighting, among others. Equally important,
the study provided the mentoring field with
operational benchmarks by which to assess
the likelihood that other mentoring pro-
grams were achieving similar impacts. It is
not necessary to do a new impact study on
each and every mentoring program—it is
only necessary to assess whether the pro-
gram meets certain operational quality
benchmarks.
Another implication of this strategic
rethinking is that it should stimulate foun-
dations to think about a field as a whole,
not just particular programs. To follow
through on the above example, the chal-
lenge for foundations interested in
mentoring post-BBBS research is (1) how
to expand mentoring, since it has positive
effects, and (2) how to ensure that expan-
sion does not dilute implementation
quality. These challenges, whether met col-
lectively or by individual foundation efforts,
are field-building and maximize positive
outcomes—even as they deal with individ-
ual mentoring programs.
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10
Strategic Issues 
(What to Do)
The second type of conclusion that can be
drawn from previous evaluations is that
many of the tested substantive strategies
were not strong enough to achieve the
desired goals. This was the sentiment that
former Secretary Reich’s earlier quote
expressed. 
In some cases, the problem was that
the goals were simply unrealistic and that
what in fact was achieved was worthwhile,
and needed to be built on. For example,
research done on STEP showed that partici-
pating youth had powerful and immediate
positive educational effects from their
summer experiences, compared with a
control group of similar youth. But several
years later, those effects had disappeared:
STEP youth performed no better in school
than did their non-STEP peers, having simi-
lar dropout and teen pregnancy rates.
Because STEP’s goal was not simply to pro-
vide a halt to learning loss and a quick lift,
but rather to “immunize” its participants
from the dropout and teen pregnancy
bugs, what is remembered about STEP is
not the positive effects it did have that
needed to be built on during the school
year, but that it “didn’t work.” Many other
youth programs suffer from the same diag-
noses, even though they do have some
positive effects (Grossman and Halpern-
Felsher, 1993).10
In other cases, the program does not seem
to have been strong enough to even build
on. For example, there is a consensus that
job training as practiced over the past three
decades does not work—because it does
not help people move out of poverty (U.S.
Department of Labor, 1995, p.i). There are
a host of well-done studies supported by
philanthropy and government, separately
and in collaboration, that are pointed to in
support of that conclusion. For most peo-
ple, there are no lesser goals that justify a
large public expenditure for job training
programs. So, public funding has declined
in response, and local entrepreneurs search
for new, more effective approaches to job
training.
What new insights can we learn from an
understanding that many of the programs
evaluated were substantially weak, unable to
achieve their lofty goals? One important
lesson for future initiatives to heed is to set
realistic expectations—and then assess
whether those realistic expectations are
worth the effort. For example, we know
that short-term programs rarely lead to
long-term change; successful human
change usually takes place in steps and gen-
erally has a difficult time being sustained in
an environment with few other supports.
This is especially true for youth, whose life
trajectories are just beginning.
But even more important, the primary
focus of a philanthropic concern about out-
comes in the late 1990s needs to be on
improving the strategy, substance and quali-
ty of what is being funded.
At first blush that statement may not seem
so dramatic, and may even offend: after
all, who in philanthropy does not care
about what is being funded, and who does
not want to help improve it? But the very
concern about outcomes and accountability
—about having a “bottom line”—when
combined with our well-developed techni-
cal capacity to measure outcomes and
impacts, and our increasing reluctance to
criticize or shape initiatives that were
designed by program operators or commu-
nity groups, can easily lead funders to rush
by the issues of strategy, substance, imple-
mentation capacity and quality. They are
much more complicated to address, and
are not easily amenable to definitive mea-
surement. They are intermediate steps on
the way to achieving bottom-line outcomes,
and they have not received consistent or
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strong emphasis over the past several
decades. They have not received that
emphasis—paradoxically enough from the
perspective of the current outcomes move-
ment—in part because we were so anxious
to believe and prove that what was funded
did produce its intended (and often grand)
outcomes that we rushed to assess them
before we had realistically assessed their
strategic, substantive and operational
soundness.
This will discourage many philanthropists;
it sounds as if we are starting over, just
when the “outcomes movement” hints that
we are nearing our goals. And the truth is,
in many areas of policy, we are starting over.
But starting over is different than starting
from scratch—there are many lessons to
build on, both positive and negative, and
those lessons make it more likely that newly
built policies and approaches can achieve
the outcomes we intend. But that building
process is the first priority—not a rush to
outcomes measurement.
For example, this is an excellent time for
philanthropy, both as individual institutions
and in groups, to support analysis of previ-
ous employment training policies and
implementation experience with an aim to
generating strategies to improve the perfor-
mance of the entire employment training
field, as well as that of particular programs.
The recent and prolonged boom in the
American economy has hidden our lack of
direction regarding what (if any) employ-
ment training policy and implementation
practice America should have or try in the
coming years. However, when the private
economy inevitably slows down, a new
direction will sorely be needed. Such wide-
angle work conducted now would not only
increase the chances of having more effec-
tive strategies, policies and programs—it
would also strengthen the resolve and clari-
ty of direction of individual foundations in
their dealings with specific grantees and
their programs.
But this work is precedent to a focus on the
bottom-line outcomes of particular pro-
grams. It is the priority if we are to achieve
those outcomes.
Some work of this nature has already
begun in several substantive areas. For
example, the authors are aware of collabo-
rative/philanthropic initiatives aimed at
improving the “what” in the areas of youth
development and workforce development.
Each initiative was developed with an open-
ness to recommendations of substantial
change in the policies, funding, substantive
and implementation strategies of that field.
Many more fields of social policy need the
same open reexamination.
An approach that acknowledges the likely
need for a major substantive overhaul in a
policy field has major implications for
thinking about outcomes. The incremental-
ist approach that has dominated the last
several decades assumed that useful
changes in policy and practice would come
in the form of additions or modest alter-
ations to extant programming—in short,
we were just a tinker away from resolving
the problem. We thus put more intellectual
capital into figuring out how to measure
the anticipated long-term outcomes than
into figuring out how to dramatically
improve substantive strategy and implemen-
tation capacity. 
The non-incrementalist approach that is
necessary now would shift that balance.
Rather than focusing on measuring long-
term participant outcomes, funders would
place greater initial emphasis not only on
shaping new substantive approaches, but
also on ensuring their quality of implemen-
tation and political durability. Adhering to
the advice that formal impact assessment is
advisable only when a program is stable
and mature, the results sought from these
new project demonstrations would focus
first on issues of implementation soundness
and contextual viability, and only when
those were satisfied would the focus on
impacts begin.
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Below are some critical substantive areas
that get to the “what” issue, and that need
individual and collective philanthropic
attention in many social policy domains:
• New Programmatic Strategies. As noted
above, several key policy areas are in need of
serious rethinking regarding their basic
substantive strategies. The employment
training area is a good example: some
analysts believe that there are experiential
and theoretical reasons for crafting a very
different set of strategies than those utilized
in the past several decades. Such crafting is
in itself an outcome that needs establishment
and assessment.
• New or Expanded Institutions. The
philanthropic world has, for the most part,
devoted its resources to funding “programs”
or “initiatives.” But often what is most
needed to achieve the ultimate outcomes we
want in a policy area is institutions—institutions
that have a reputation for stability and
performance. The Ford Foundation’s strategy
in the arts world during the 1950s-70s is an
excellent example.
• Brand-Name Institutions. For policy areas
that require interaction across the public,
nonprofit and commercial sectors, achieving
“brand-name” status is often precedent to or
at least simultaneous with the possibility of
achieving impact. Building brand-name
institutions is an outcome in itself.
• Capacity Building. In some areas of social
policy there are sound programmatic
strategies and brand-name institutions—the
youth development area, with its Boys & Girls
Clubs and Big Brothers Big Sisters, is an
example—but there is simply insufficient
capacity to reach their intended outcomes at
a sufficient scale. Building capacity is an
outcome worth defining and measuring.
• Filling Gaps. In some areas of social policy,
analysis indicates that there are enormous
substantive gaps that stand in the way of
achieving the outcomes we all want. One
example is after-school programming, which
has been steadily reduced over the past
several decades and which many analysts
think is a key both to providing youth with
critical development inputs (more adults,
more engaging activities, more educational
assistance) and to reducing negative
behaviors (crime, school dropout, teen
parenting).
This particular “gap-filling” strategy would
have as its primary goal the building of a
variety of high-quality, well-supervised,
engaging after-school activities that attract a
broad cross-section of youth. These outcomes
might take several years to achieve; only then
would it be reasonable to assess whether
ultimate outcomes were being achieved. If
they were not, the question then would be if
the appropriate response were to quit
funding after-school activities or to
investigate whether other policy areas needed
strengthening. Ultimate outcomes cannot
always be laid at the accountability doorstep
of one programmatic strategy.
As the discussion above suggests, in our
judgment the greatest need over the com-
ing years is not simply more declaration of
outcomes, envisioning of outcomes and
assessment of outcomes; it is figuring out
what to do to get those outcomes and, even
more important, to get the desired impacts.
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We do not recommend a moratorium on all out-
come and impact assessments. In some settings,
formal impact evaluation is what is called for.
What we are arguing for is a strategic rethinking
of when to utilize the tools of formal outcome and
impact research. The bottom line is that get-
ting to outcomes, measuring them,
identifying the benchmarks along the way,
and knowing how to influence an entire
field are complex issues. It is not always so
simple as making the specification of out-
comes a priority, or deciding to spend
more funds on evaluation.
A commitment to specifying and measuring
outcomes is only the beginning step in a
rigorous, thoughtful process. It is the com-
mitment to that process that is necessary if
the “outcomes movement” is to prove use-
ful to philanthropy, grantees and society.
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